For the second part of this discussion, there must be a consensus that one of the major drivers that relegates Georgetown football to where it is situated has been, and continues to be, cost.
Georgetown underfunded this program relative to its Patriot League peers when it joined, it is underfunded today, and it is likely to continue to be underfunded going forward--not with malice aforethought, but that the absence of a scholarship tradition at Georgetown coupled with the financial tightrope Georgetown walks with a 30-team program and one major revenue source has been restrictive at best and a constrictor at worst.
In theory, the Georgetown Way calls to mind an Ivy League model of days gone by, where men were admitted to a university and paid their way, not merely to play football In practice, and in a world where the cost of education approaches figures unthinkable by the likes of Percy Haughton, Tad Jones, or Lou Little, it's become untenable. In 1980, the cost of a year at Georgetown University was roughly 25 percent the cost of an year's earnings for a middle class family- sizeable, but not completely overwhelming. In 2025, it's now at 126 percent for that same family. Affordability, or the lack of it, is a deal maker and deal breaker every football program that does not offer scholarships for admission.
In 2000, Georgetown was one of 33 schools in the Northeast which did not offer athletic scholarships in I-AA football. In 2025, Georgetown is one of just ten--eight are in the Ivy League, the other is Marist. Seeking to be more the former than the latter, Georgetown's financial aid is aligned with that of the Ivies, leading to this paradox: it competes (with Ivies) where it does not play, and plays (with the Patriot) where it does not compete.
The next three topics address how Georgetown could consider a more competitive approach for recruiting and retaining student-athletes in football. Note that, at least in public, these are not current approaches and if they are being used in some form or fashion, it's certainly news to me and a lot of other Georgetown fans and alumni. Assuming they are not, we begin to look at three approaches with medium cost and with a change to the program as it currently stands.
1. Ivy-Plus Recruiting (medium cost, low program change).
Since 1978, Georgetown University has subscribed to a financial aid model which has, more than any single external factor, has elevated it to the elite of American higher education. Known as "need-blind, full need" admissions, Georgetown does not consider the parents' ability to pay when making an admissions decision, something only very few schools are financially confident enough to do. Secondly, once accepted, it is committed to meeting the gap between the overall cost of attendance and the family's ability to pay, otherwise known as the "expected family contribution," or EFC.
In 1978, Georgetown allocated $2 million for this gap. As of this week's Board of Directors announcement, that number is $286 million, the largest single expenditure at the University outside faculty salaries. As a result, Georgetown spends more on aid in a single year than the total endowment of Xavier University.
Full-need financial aid makes a Georgetown admission offer extremely valuable, but less so for families where the EFC is not favorable. For a family with an annual income of $50,000, an offer to Georgetown is close to a full-ride grant, athletics or not. For a family of $125,000, considerably less so. As such, one of the underreported stories of the last generation has been the evisceration of the middle class at Georgetown, which is, as much as any time in our memory, a place for the children of the working poor and for those of means.
Putting aside some recent litigation on this issue, if the EFC number was a consistent figure that applied across all schools, a student would have a truly rational decision on where to attend, but it's not: an offer from Harvard and an offer from Hillsdale College would be comparable. It's not.
At Harvard, applicants with a household income of $100,000 or less pay $0 for tuition, room, and board. Families with a household income of $200,000 pay nothing for tuition but would need a parent contribution for room and board. Each of the Ivies, along with schools such as Vanderbilt, Rice, Johns Hopkins, and Stanford, are similarly generous, while others commit to full aid by grant, without loans of any kind.
These schools share one thing in common: an endowment in the tens of billions to cover such costs. Georgetown University, with an endowment one-fourth that of Hopkins and one-fourteenth that of Harvard, cannot compete with this. Thus, a Georgetown offer, while competitive to those of lesser means, quickly becomes less so when it requires loans and a higher EFC for middle income applicants, particularly those above $80,000.
Back to football: the Pell Grant recruit who considers Georgetown and an Ivy program is going to have comparable offers and one comparable with a PL football scholarship at Colgate or Lehigh. Beyond $80,000 or so, a middle class family will begin to see gaps of $5,000 to $15,000 from Georgetown and the others. Above $150,000, an Ivy offer may be significantly more favorable.
As long as Georgetown is competing among this cohort for admissions, that's a big deal. That's not to say every GU recruit is going to an Ivy school, but absent football scholarships and a separate admission track afforded to sports as GU basketball enjoys, grades and aid are the drivers between playing football at Georgetown and playing somewhere else. More often that not, aid wins out.
Prior to 2013, the Patriot League funding model allowed for what was called the "buyout" of the parent contribution: for example, an EFC of $15,000 could be assumed by the athletic department and recorded on its budget, not that of the financial aid office. This became the need-based equivalency for FCS purposes, allowing some PL schools to offer as much or more than as 56.7 equivalencies for FBS guarantee games without the definition of a scholarship. The move to a scholarship model in the PL converted these amounts to athletic scholarships at al schools but Georgetown, rendering competition with these schools for recruits even more daunting. A kid from Delbarton with a choice of paying $20,000 a year to go to Georgetown or getting a free ride at Holy Cross will, all things being equal, go to Worcester.
Money offered by the financial aid office is, and remains, based on demonstrated need. For this argument, there needs to be some conversation about targeted fundraising that would allow Georgetown football to compete at a figure (for argument's sake, a household income between $80,000 and $125,000) where the gap between Georgetown's offer and that of a comparable Ivy school would be matched by the athletic department beyond Georgetown's need formula, and independent of the loan buyouts. This fund would effectively create a range of income beyond the Georgetown EFC where football would meet and cover the gap between Georgetown's EFC and that of peer schools, perhaps even to include PL scholarship offers.
No, it would not be for everyone, but not every recruit fits into this category. If a $200,000 annual fund could support 20 students that had a $10,000 gap by an "Ivy-Plus" offer, that's still no more than five recruits in a cycle which the staff could offer it to, and likely it becomes a decision for the coaches whether to use this on a recruit. Unlike financial aid, it's a budget item that Athletics would have to absorb through philanthropy, and if the fundraising isn't there, neither is the offer.
There's room for discussion if this stretches the need based model of Georgetown too far, and that's a fair argument. Would such a model introduce athletic performance to the aid formula, or merely meet the need that is otherwise offered in the marketplace? It's a discussion worth having.
2. Flex Aid (medium cost, medium program change).
The Ivy-Plus approach to financial aid works, if up to a point. Many Georgetown recruits will come from families where financial need will not be available under any measure, and others simply can't reasonably justify Georgetown against comparable programs that will offer more generous aid, whether in a scholarship or a full aid, loan-free package. A discussion about whether there is capacity among the donor pool to support limited equivalency grants is a healthy one.
Before someone sounds the alarm and says "That means FOOTBALL SCHOLARSHIPS!", let's take a step back.
Georgetown University hasn't offered a grant-in-aid for football in 75 years. Far be it some sort of statement of academic purity, such a belief was always about cost: they did not want to be saddled with the cost of 81 grants, even when tuition was $1,400 a year. When football returned in 1964, administrative opposition was not about academic slippery slopes, it was about cost. The "Football For Fun" movement carefully used its words in its proposals to the University, stressing it would not be "big time"; which, then or now, connoted universities that spent beyond Georgetown's means.
Whether in the club football era or Division III, "cost containment" was the driver, from the players themselves right down to the part-time coaches which served the program selflessly and more than most ever knew. It was also a tacit reflection that Georgetown didn't see a community of interest to support anything more than what low level football would provide: opportunity, but not enough support to get in the way of institutional commitments to its bellwether programs in basketball and track.
This theory endured in the move to I-AA, where football pivoted to the MAAC and thus could continue to play similarly-situated (read=low budget) schools. Eight years later, the move to the Patriot was framed, in part, among similarly situated schools that kept costs low.
In 2012, Georgetown was the only PL school to vote no to the league's move to scholarship football. Former president Jack DeGioia drew the line on football grants with his claim that "I don’t believe that [football scholarships] fits the ethos and the culture of Georgetown", though no one called him on the follow-up: do soccer scholarships fit the ethos and culture? How about volleyball? Do golf and tennis and baseball, each of which receive small but worthy scholarship opportunities, contribute to the ethos and culture that football is somehow unfit to do?
DeGioia's follow-up in that quote bears a second look.
He continued, "I’m not supportive that Georgetown would follow the move that Fordham did and go to 63 scholarships. It’s just very expensive and I don’t think it’s commensurate in who we are and in our aspirations for our athletic program."
Once again, it was about "very expensive". That Georgetown has been able to tread water through a decade of PL scholarship football is a credit to Georgetown teams and a couple of teams they can surprise now and then, but as Holy Cross proved under Bob Chesney and the three CAA arrivals are about to magnify, there's no surprises anymore.
By 2026, at least nine games, maybe as many as 11 of 12, will be against scholarship opponents--some will spend more, others less, but each will have the flexibility to recruit and admit from middle-income and high-income households that Georgetown cannot m match. A full need approach is an increasing challenge to the coaching staff to address and remain reasonably competitive.
DeGioia's comment about 63 scholarships as "just very expensive" begs this question: does Georgetown need 63 scholarships? Probably not, though it wouldn't hurt. What it needs, and sooner rather than later, is a discussion about what sum of annual giving, directed at a fundraising pool which could fund additive aid for a limited number of impact recruits (say, three or four a year) would give Georgetown a fighting chance at recruiting against comparable schools.
Could the Gridiron Club raise $300,000 a year for five grants of $15,000 annually, presumably covering a four year commitment, that would allow the staff to combine this with a financial aid package? A recruit from a six figure family income may still have an hefty EFC from Georgetown, but could an additional $15,000 grant, (literally, an equivalency) make Georgetown competitive?
Five $15,000 grants isn't 63 scholarships and not even close--it's literally less than one equivalency. On the margin, however, it may be enough, with need aid, to land the impact QB or RB which GU has been visibly missing for years on end. and it does so with outside giving, thus freeing the University from the institutional angst that it cannot afford to do so. If the support club can't raise the funds, the grants aren't awarded, full stop.
But if it can, it should be discussed. If baseball (a proud program which labored without a winning record for over three decades) was given the green light to raise over $5 million for partial grants, the ethos and culture of Georgetown didn't come crashing down, and neither would it for football.
3. NIL (medium cost, high program change).
The cloud that hangs across all college sports takes a darker turn this fall, and if you think Patriot League football is immune from such concerns, think again.
In 2022, athletic director Lee Reed and former board chairman Paul Tagliabue warned alumni at the John Carroll Weekend in Nashville of the perfidy of name, image, and license opportunities being co-opted by Southeastern Conference schools. A year later at John Carroll in San Francisco, with new coach Ed Cooley in the room, Georgetown did a 180 and announced it was in the NIL game as well. The combination of a Supreme Court decision and the inability of the NCAA to police its own members led Division I programs outside the Ivy League to jump into the pool.
Beginning this fall, following the House decision, NCAA schools that choose to opt in to the settlement may offer up to $20 million per school annually in what is loosely called revenue sharing to student-athletes. Few outside the major college programs will offer anything close to $20 million and fewer still have identified exactly which sports they'll actually cover, though Oklahoma AD Joe Castiglione named six: football, men's basketball, women's basketball, baseball, softball and women's gymnastics. The last three may surprise some but they are sports where donors, not just media contracts, can provide the dollars that can elevate the Sooners to national championships. The OU softball team, for example, has won four of the past five NCAA championships and lost in the 2025 final to Texas Tech, a school which has gone all-in on softball NIL.
Georgetown hasn't announced which teams figure to join in revenue sharing. Basketball is a given. Football isn't likely, but it doesn't have to be a byproduct of media rights. As in the previous discussion, the ability of Georgetown to externally raise some amount of money annually for targeted football NIL/rev-share/whatever-you-want-to-call-it is another tool in the recruiting toolbox.
But is this even necessary in the Patriot League?
Well, don't look now, but the days of the collective, either in-house or externally run, have arrived in the land of The Last Amateurs. The PL will never be the land of SEC and Big 10 football, where dozens of players will receive $3 million or more each next season, but by 2026 this will be a factor at the higher levels of PL recruiting, as sure as it is in the Big East today for basketball.
In the case of recruiting an impact grad transfer, an FBS transfer, or a high income recruit that isn't getting aid to begin with, the program needs to do the math and determine if outside giving could or should be solicited in advance to cover limited NIL grants for this cohort, much as was discussed above for flex aid. Maybe it's not a priority unless and until scholarship support is settled, and that's OK, but the football staff knows that other PL schools will be going down this road soon, and Georgetown isn't doing itself any favors by looking away.
Think of the three topics in this article as variations on a theme: Ivy-Plus as addressing the gaps for the lower income recruit, flex aid as addressing Georgetown's competitive gaps in middle income applicants, and NIL as a selective option for a high income, high impact candidate. These are externally solicited giving to support program needs, in a way that is more transparent than Georgetown has been to date with its football donors. Unlike the ideas discussed in Part One, these involve some five and six figure donors, and that needs to be considered in a period of change in the Georgetown athletics model. Properly positioned, however, this could open up opportunities for football in a way that the current opaque fundraising model does not meet, and one will be severely tested otherwise in the years to come.
In part 3 of this series, a look at three other expensive and impactful options that may also be considered in a changing athletic world.